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ABSTRACT Drawing on theories of political competition, we explore the extent to which 
local public housing reform reflects the ideology of local ruling parties and local political 
preferences. Based on the citizen candidate and median voter perspectives, we hypothesise 
that left-wing party rule and pro-state preferences are associated with higher levels of 
government-owned housing. We test these hypotheses by analysing the levels of housing 
stock held by English local governments during the period 2001-14. Our findings suggest that 
pro-state preferences matter more than left-wing party rule for the overall extent of public 
housing provision. By contrast, right-wing party rule is associated with the likelihood that a 
local government’s housing stock will be transferred out of the public sector, but pro-market 
preferences do not influence this decision. The implications of the findings are discussed in 
the conclusion. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Reform of the local public sector has become an important objective for national and regional 
governments across the globe as they seek to modernize the design and delivery of key public 
services (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011). From the contracting out of corporate, social and 
technical services to the wholesale externalisation of entire functions, the past forty years has 
seen a dramatic shift in the ways in which the local state manages and provides public 
services (Bel, Hebdon and Warner, 2007). The impact of these changes has perhaps been 
nowhere more evident than in the controversial and politically sensitive area of housing 
policy. In response to mounting financial pressures, the public housing sector in Europe, in 
particular, has been subject to wide-ranging reforms aimed at making the market for 
affordable housing more flexible and reducing the cost of public housing to the taxpayer 
(Scanlon, Fernandez-Arrigoitia and Whitehead, 2015). These developments have been 
especially prominent in England, where tenants’ right to buy their own ‘council house’ was 
established in 1980, and later large-scale voluntary transfer (LSVT) of all publicly-owned 
local housing stock to not-for-profit housing associations has been encouraged by both 
Conservative and Labour national governments. Although the economic and ideological 
rationales behind LSVT have been discussed in the public policy literature, to date, 
comparatively little research has systematically analysed the local politics of this far-reaching 
reform, even though the transfer of public housing stock required the support of existing 
tenants (Pawson and Mullins, 2010). The salience of political influences on the decision to 
transfer housing stock is thus an important area of theoretical and empirical study that can 
cast light on some of the forces that shape the adoption of, and resistance to, public 
management reforms at the local level. In this paper, we therefore seek to illustrate the 
relative importance of local politics for the public sector by examining its influence on the 
public ownership of housing in English local governments.  
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The adoption of new organizational forms for the delivery of key local public services 
has generally been regarded as an important means to generate service innovations and to cut 
costs (Bel, Hebdon and Warner, 2007). Despite the impact of these wider pressures to 
reconfigure the public sector, not all countries have reformed social housing provision to the 
same degree, with many preferring to retain ownership of most or all of the stock that they 
have accumulated during the post-war welfare boom (Scanlon, Fernandez-Arrigoitia and 
Whitehead, 2015). In England, much of the debate in favour of housing stock transfer 
focused on the economic benefits that divestment of such expensive-to-maintain assets might 
bring to the local public sector (Malpass and Murie, 1999). However, ideological and 
political influences have also appeared to be important. The Conservative national 
governments responsible for promoting stock transfer during the 1980s and 1990s were noted 
for the ideological zeal with which they pursued public sector reform (Florio, 2013). 
Moreover, there is evidence that Conservative local governments were enthusiastic early-
adopters of stock transfer as a means to reconfigure housing service provision on more cost-
efficient lines (Malpass and Mullins, 2002). Nevertheless, while the party political influences 
shaping local public housing reforms may have evolved in the wake of the New Labour 
national government’s re-booting of LSVT to regenerate inner-city housing (Pawson and 
Mullins, 2010), few studies have systematically evaluated the extent of these influences on 
stock ownership decisions at the local level. Drawing on theories of political competition, we 
offer such an analysis in this paper. 
The existing literature on the politics of local government decision-making is largely 
oriented around two key perspectives on political competition: the citizen-candidate and the 
median voter models. The citizen candidate model assumes that local policy decisions are 
made on the basis of the core ideological commitments of the ruling party of any given local 
government (Osborne and Slivinski 1996). From a slightly different point of view, the 
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median voter model supposes that ruling parties of whatever political persuasion are forced to 
adopt only those policies that reflect local political preferences (Downs, 1957). Hence, 
despite encouragement to transfer housing stock away from public ownership from national 
governments of different political hues, there is good reason to still expect that local party 
ideology and political preferences may influence the prospect of local public housing reform. 
In analysing the relationship between local politics and public ownership of social housing, 
we therefore seek to address the following questions: Is public housing reform more likely in 
local governments led by right-wing than left-wing parties? Are areas with pro-market 
preferences more open to the transfer of social housing away from public ownership than 
those with pro-state preferences? And, finally, is local political ideology more important than 
local political preferences in determining the outcome of housing reform proposals?  
To answer these questions, we carry out statistical analysis of the levels of housing 
stock held by English local governments between 2001 and 2014. The effects of local politics 
on the public ownership of social housing are estimated using a Zero Inflated Negative 
Binomial model, with appropriate controls for relevant organizational and environmental 
characteristics. In the following section, we explore how ideological and political influences 
arguably shape decisions about public housing, drawing on the citizen candidate and median 
voter models advanced in alternative theories of political competition. Thereafter, we 
introduce the data and methods used to carry out the study, and discuss the statistical results. 
We conclude the paper by considering the implications of the findings from our study.  
 
IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL INFLUENCES ON PUBLIC 
HOUSING REFORM 
In England, the conventional motivation behind the transfer of local governments’ housing 
stock has been the belief that this would enable them to achieve substantial cost savings, 
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whilst retaining comparable service quality (Malpass and Mullins, 2002). From a practical 
viewpoint, housing stock transfer can enable local governments to resolve the persistent 
tension between the minimisation of rents and the maximisation of central government 
subsidies that characterises the management of large public housing stocks (Murie, 1997). 
From a more theoretical perspective, externalisation of the production and maintenance of 
social housing may conceivably lead to both efficiency and quality improvements because it 
implies transferring service production away from a public sector monopoly to a scenario 
where multiple providers compete for business (Domberger and Jensen, 1997). However, in 
practice, stock transfer has usually resulted in the publicly-owned housing within a given 
local government area being transferred to a single not-for-profit provider – a housing 
association, which is then regulated by UK central government agencies (Pawson and 
Mullins, 2010).  
From a theoretical point of view, the takeover of social housing provision by the non-
profit sector in the UK can be seen as a result of its distinctive sectoral advantage in the field 
of social welfare, where non-profits’ engagement with and understanding of disadvantaged 
social groups can enable them to better tailor services to the needs of those groups (Selsky 
and Parker, 2005). More pragmatically, however, non-profit provision of social housing is 
sometimes seen, on the one hand, as a means for the local state to retain some control over 
housing provision, and, on the other, as a politically acceptable privatisation of the local 
welfare state (Pawson and Mullins, 2010). Indeed, in England, the housing stock transfer 
process itself is a highly politicised one, with local governments seeking to transfer housing 
stock away from public ownership requiring the support of a majority of council tenants in a 
transfer ballot (Department of Communities and Local Government, 2009). As a result, 
public housing reform remains an arena for local political contestation in a way that the 
centralized reform of health and education services in England has largely precluded (Murie, 
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1997). For this reason, housing stock transfer in English local governments represents an 
especially apt context in which to test theories of political competition. 
Public choice theorists have long pointed towards the importance of ideological and 
political influences on local government decision-making (Downs, 1957; Niskanen, 1971; 
Tullock, 1965). The dynamics of these influences on policy-making are largely captured in 
two key perspectives on political competition: the citizen-candidate model and the median 
voter model; each of which draw attention to vital sources underpinning efforts to establish 
authority and influence over the content and direction of public policy.  
The citizen-candidate model focuses on the ideology of political parties, emphasising 
that the ideological commitments of the ruling political party are an important influence on a 
government’s policy choices (Besley and Coate, 1997; Osborne and Slivinski, 1996). In 
theory, right-wing parties prefer the free market as a mechanism for allocating goods and 
services, whereas left-wing parties favour government intervention in the economy and 
society. From this perspective, then, governments led by right-wing parties are linked with 
reforms to the public sector that weaken the grip of the state over public services. By contrast, 
governments led by left-wing parties are thought to be antagonistic towards alternatives to 
state provision, and, therefore, assumed to prefer the extension rather than the reduction of 
state ownership of public services (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996).While this idea is supported 
by several previous studies of privatisation and contracting out by local governments (e.g. 
Elinder and Jordahl 2013; Picazo-Tadeo et al. 2012; Sundell and Lapuente 2012), to date, it 
has not been systematically tested in many other areas of local public setor reform. Moreover, 
little effort has been made to apply the citizen-candidate model in England (though see 
Alonso, Andrews and Hodgkinson, 2016), even though the local government system in the 
country has experienced a wave of reforms advocating alternatives to the conventional in-
house provision of public services (Bovaird, Briggs and Willis, 2014).  
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One particular advantage of applying the citizen-candidate model within the English 
local government context, is that the political control of local governments in England is 
almost entirely held by national-level political parties that divide strongly along ideological 
grounds. Even though there has been some ideological convergence between the main left-
wing (Labour) and right-wing (Conservative) parties in recent times (Adams, Green and 
Milazzo, 2012), important differences in the policy positions adopted by the two parties still 
persist (Smith 2010). In general, the Labour Party continues to favour greater state 
involvement in the provision of public services than the Conservative Party. Indeed, during 
their last term of office, the Labour national government invested large sums of public money 
in an effort to improve the quality of those services, including increased resources for the 
upgrade of local government-owned social housing (Pawson, 2006). The ideological 
differences between the Conservative and Labour Party may therefore matter for the 
enactment of public housing reform, because local, like national, politics continues to be 
dominated by these parties. In fact, those differences might even matter more at the local 
level, where the ideological ‘purity’ of Conservative–led councils contrasts with those Labour 
controlled governments that may have been resistant to the ‘modernising’ ethos of the ‘new’ 
Labour national governments of the 2000s (Bache, 2003). Based on these arguments, our first 
hypothesis is therefore: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Left-wing political control will be positively related to the size of public 
housing stock    
 
In contrast to the citizen-candidate model, the median voter model emphasises the 
salience of citizens’ attitudes, and challenges the assumption of the citizen-candidate model 
that ideological differences generate public policies. Based on Downs’ (1957) conception of 
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political competition, the median voter model predicts that policy choices will be more 
strongly conditioned by the preferences of the average citizen than the ideological 
commitments and pronouncements of political parties. More precisely, in a majoritarian 
voting system, outcomes will converge towards the preferences held by the median voter due 
to the relative acceptability of those preferences to those at the opposite ends of the spectrum 
of preferences (Black, 1958). In our case, citizens’ preferences about the size and scope of 
government are likely to be critically important determinants of politicians’ decision-making 
regarding public sector reforms, especially at the local level, where public expenditures have 
long been found to be responsive to citizen demand (Gramlich and Rubinfeld 1982). From 
this perspective, then, the assumption that reform enactment (and resistance) will be shaped 
by the demands of the median voter seems perfectly reasonable. Nevertheless, despite the 
venerable intellectual lineage of the median voter model, the evidence supporting its validity 
in predicting local policy decisions is less clear-cut than that for the citizen candidate model. 
For example, a range of studies fail to uncover evidence of its influence on privatisation by 
local governments (e.g. Brudney et al. 2005; Elinder and Jordahl 2013; Picazo-Tadeo et al. 
2012). However, a small number have identified a connection between citizens’ attitudes and 
local public service redesign (e.g. Alonso, Andrews and Hodkinson, 2016; Hefetz and 
Warner 2003).  
In England, voters’ attitudes towards public spending, and the state funding and 
provision of public services tend to follow party political lines, with Conservative voters least 
committed to the state provision of public services and most committed to privatisation, and 
Labour voters most likely to hold the opposite viewpoints (Adams, Green and Milazzo, 2012; 
Clarke et al. 2004). As such, voting behaviour is likely to represent an effective means for 
capturing the effects of the median voter on English local governments, especially as 
Conservative voters are more likely to occupy managerial roles in private sector firms (Evans 
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and Tilley, 2012), and Labour voters are more likely to belong to trade unions hostile to 
public sector reforms (Foster and Scott 1998). Furthermore, these dynamics may be 
particularly important for housing reform efforts, since council tenants are traditionally 
assumed to favour Labour party rule (Evans and Tilley, 2012). Thus, whatever the ideological 
commitments held by political parties serving populations with a large proportion of 
Conservative voters, for example, they may face greater pressure to reorganize and remodel 
public service provision. Likewise, where local governments decide to attempt the transfer of 
housing away from public ownership, areas with a higher proportion of Labour voters seem 
more likely to resist such proposals. As a result, our second hypothesis is: 
 
Hypothesis 2: Pro-state preferences will be positively related to the size of public housing 
stock    
 
DATA AND MEASURES 
To test our hypotheses, we deploy in this paper a set of multivariate statistical methods using 
data collected from English local governments for the period 2001 to 2014. These 
governments are elected bodies, with a Westminster-style cabinet system of political 
management, which is typically composed of senior members of the ruling political party. 
English local governments receive the majority of their income from UK central government, 
and so their decision-making is heavily influenced by national level policy and regulatory 
frameworks. In terms of service delivery, they are multi-purpose authorities delivering 
education, social care, land-use planning, waste management, public housing, leisure and 
culture, and welfare benefits. In 2014, there were 358 local governments of five types in 
England: 54 unitary authorities (UAs); 32 London boroughs; and 36 metropolitan boroughs, 
mostly in urban areas providing all the services listed above; and, in rural areas, 27 county 
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councils, responsible for waste management, education, social services, and strategic 
planning, with 201 district councils beneath them administering benefits, housing, leisure and 
cultural services. For the purpose of our analysis, county councils are excluded since they are 
not responsible for managing housing services. 
 English local governments have been involved in the provision of social housing since 
the establishment of the modern local government system in the 1890s. Initially, this involved 
regulation of the bad practices of private landlords, but was extended by legislation in the 
wake of the first world war to inaugurate a programme of local public housing construction to 
provide ‘homes fit for heroes’ (Holmans, 1987). This construction programme was vastly 
accelerated by the post-second world war Labour government, and for the first time 
introduced the idea of affordable homes for all – so much so that there was a surplus of local 
government-owned homes in the late 1960s (Hanley, 2012). However, as noted above, with 
the advent of the New Right in the 1970s, the national political consensus around the public 
ownership of social housing broke down, and the Conservative governments of the 1980s 
established tenants’ right-to-buy their council homes and subsequently encouraged housing 
stock transfer.  
The housing policy of the ‘new’ Labour governments of the 2000s was marked by a 
continuation of the preceding Conservative policies.  In particular, in addition to the 
perpetuation of the right-to-buy scheme, substantial financial incentives for the transfer of 
housing were offered to those Labour voting inner-city areas with a large and deteriorating 
stock of public housing. Nevertheless, despite this central steering of the social housing 
market, responsibility for the implementation of social housing policy still remains very 
much in the hands of local government. Hence, while levels of stock ownership and housing 
services expenditure may vary considerably, local governments choose whether or not to 
propose transferring housing stock to private providers, not-for-profit housing associations or 
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a local authority-owned Arms-Length Management Organisation (ALMO) set up to provide 
social housing. More generally, decisions about eligibility for social housing assistance, 
accomodation for vulnerable people and homelessness support services still remain an 
important function of the local state.  
It should be noted that, during the period under examination, the two-tier element of 
the English local government system in rural areas experienced a relatively significant 
process of restructuring. On 1st April 2009 nine UAs were created from the combination of 
district councils. In five areas (Cornwall, Durham, Northumberland, Shropshire and 
Wiltshire) the districts were merged with the former county council which became the new 
UA. The four remaining areas were formed as follows: Cheshire East merged Congleton, 
Crewe and Nantwich, and Macclesfield; Cheshire West was formed from Chester, Ellesmere 
Port and Neston, and Vale Royal; Bedford from Bedford district; and Central Bedfordshire 
from Mid Bedfordshire and South Bedfordshire (Andrews and Boyne, 2012). To facilitate 
analysis of the politics of public housing reform it is necessary, therefore, to define a unit of 
analysis that can be observed before and after this reorganization occurred. In this paper, we 
use post-2009 boundaries, hence pre-2009 data for all nine new UAs is based on aggregates 
of data from local governments existing before the 2009 amalgamation. 
 
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable, housing stock, is a count of the dwellings owned by English local 
governments. While the dependent variable is a simple count indicator, one advantage of this 
approach is that we are able to clearly identify whether or not reform of housing provision 
has actually occurred. Data on the dwelling stock was obtained from the UK Department for 
Communities and Local Government, which publishes a range of online statistics relating to 
the social housing provision within the areas served by English local governments. Data 
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sources for the other variables included in our analysis are reported in Table 1, along with 
descriptive statistics. 
 
Independent variables 
The primary independent variables of interest are two indicators that should capture the 
influence of political parties on local decision-making and preferences about the size and role 
of government, among local voters. The variables we use for our analysis are the best 
available proxy variables for testing the citizen-candidate and median voter perspectives on 
political competition using longitudinal data. First, to evaluate the influence of ideology when 
retaining public housing stock, we include in our model a dichotomous variable which takes a 
value of 1 if the Labour party controls the local government and 0 otherwise. The prediction, 
as discussed in the previous section, is that local governments led by left-wing parties will 
keep higher stocks of public dwellings than those with non-left party rule.  
Second, we use the percentage share of the vote gained by the Labour Party in local 
elections to capture preferences in favour of retaining public housing stock. Local residents 
voting Labour are expected to have a ‘collectivist’ pro-state disposition favouring public 
ownership of social services (see Clarke et al. 2004). Ideally, we would draw on surveys 
directly asking local residents about their attitudes towards housing, but such survey data are 
not available on an annual basis for the period under consideration, and are rarely collected 
from a large enough sample in each locality to guarantee representativeness. While all 
‘proxy’ measures are contestable, the vote share of local political parties has been used in 
tests of the median voter theorem in numerous countries (e.g. Sweden - Elinder and Jordahl, 
2013; Spain - Picazo-Tadeo et al. 2012). Hence, our approach may be readily generaliseable 
to, and replicable in, other settings. Furthermore, during the study period, local elections in 
England were largely a contest between the two main political parties and the vote share 
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obtained by either of those parties may be an even more reliable indicator of the median 
voter’s attitudes than in other countries - especially given the different attitudes towards 
public ownership among Labour and Conservative voters (Evans and Tilley, 2012). 
It is important to highlight that although housing transfers are dependent upon council 
housing tenants voting to support local governments’ proposals for the transfer of the housing 
stock, ballot results can be influenced by the preferences of the whole local population. In 
particular, citizenship pressures, in the form of anti-privatization campaigns, may have 
prevented many housing stock transfer proposals from even reaching the ballot state (Pawson 
and Mullins, 2010). Organised campaigns against housing reform were especially active 
during the 2000s, with many being coordinated by the Defend Council Housing (DCH) 
network and trade unions.  The DCH, for instance, helped local activists by providing support 
for campaigns, meetings, newsletters, and so on, during option appraisals and then ballots 
(Pawson and Mullins, 2010). Following from this, we argue here that these campaigns may 
have received stronger support in more collectivist local governments, measured as the 
Labour party vote share. Tenants rejecting housing transfers could, therefore, have been more 
influenced by wider citizen opposition to policies perceived to be antithetical to their 
preferences. In fact, in more collectivist local governments, citizens’ pressure may even have 
prevented transfer proposals being developed at all. 
 
Control variables 
We include in our models a set of social and economic variables which may also influence 
the scale of publicly-owned social housing within a local government. First, more vulnerable 
citizens have been widely hypothesized to favour local government provision of public 
services, particularly low-income citizens and ethnic minorities (Thompson and Elling 2000; 
Brudney et al. 2005). To account for the impact of vulnerable groups on local government 
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decision-making relating to public housing reform we include in our model four different 
indicators: first, the relative quantity of service need within the local population is measured 
using the average ward scores of the English Indices of Multiple Deprivation (IMD) for each 
local government; and, second, three dimensions of the diversity of service needs within an 
area are also measured: age, ethnicity and social class diversity. The proportions of the 
different age, ethnic and social sub-groups within the local population identified in the UK 
national census was squared, and the sum of the squares was subtracted from 10,000, with a 
higher level of diversity reflected in a higher score of the index.  
In addition to gauging the influence of the quantity and diversity of service needs on 
the prospects of public housing reform adoption and resistance, we include the population of 
each local government in our models to control for the likelihood that governments serving 
more populated areas need to provide a larger number of dwellings than those serving smaller 
populations. Finally, we take into account the possibility that higher housing expenditures 
may influence a local government’s decision to attempt to reduce their public housing stock 
(see Malpass and Mullins, 2002) by including in our models a measure of each local 
government’s social housing spending per capita.   
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
METHODOLOGY 
In order to investigate the influence of political control and voter attitudes on the levels of 
housing stock held by English local governments during the period 2001-14, we use a Zero 
Inflated Negative Binomial (ZINB) regression model. As discussed in the previous section, 
our dependent variable, i.e. the number of publicly owned dwellings, is a count variable. 
When analysing count data, such as the local government-owned housing stock, simple linear 
regression methods may result in inconsistent, inefficient, and biased estimates due to the 
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discrete and nonnegative nature of count variables (Long, 1997; Cameron and Trivedi, 1998). 
These properties of count data suggest that perhaps a Poisson model should be used (see, for 
example, Winkelmann, 2000).  
However, the first two moments for the Poisson distribution assume that the 
conditional variance is equal to the expected value (Hausman et al., 1984), an assumption 
which, in practice, is often too strong. In our case, preliminary analysis suggests that the 
variance of the public housing stock count is much larger than the mean (see Table 1), a 
condition known as over-dispersion. In addition, there also seem to be an ‘excessive’ number 
of zeroes in our data set. Figure 1 presents the frequency distribution of public housing stock 
for the period 2001-2014, where zeros constitute about 24% of the total number of counts in 
the data. Therefore, to account for both over-dispersion issues and an excess of zeroes a 
ZINB regression model should be applied (Long 1997). 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
ZINB models extend the single-equation negative binomial (NB) model and introduce 
a two-stage process which can incorporate a potential excess of zeroes in the data-generating 
process (Long, 1997). In our case, the first stage of the model includes a logit regression 
model predicting the probability of whether a local government will keep any housing stock 
at all during the period under analysis. There are several key potential reasons for the 
presence of “always zeroes” in our data set, which permit us to analyse determinants of the 
likelihood of housing stock transfer.  
First, it is conceivable that local governments could have transferred all their housing 
stock before the beginning of the period under analysis. Housing transfer policies, once 
committed, are difficult to reverse due to the high political and financial costs associated with 
undertaking such a far-reaching policy u-turn – indeed, to date, no such reversals have 
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occurred in England. More specifically, as hypothesised above, stock transfer may reflect the 
avowed ideology of a right-wing ruling party. Pawson and Mullins (2010) suggest that 
housing stock transfers during the late 1980s and 1990s were especially likely in local 
governments ruled by the Conservative party. They also highlight that for reasons of high 
cost and low overall demand, transfers were more likely to occur in rural districts, rather than 
in urban areas. Hence, in the logit part of the model, we include a dichotomous variable 
taking the value of 1 if the Conservative party holds the local government and 0 otherwise. In 
addition, we include a dichotomous variable coded 1 for those governments serving rural 
populations and 0 for those serving urban populations. This variable was based on the urban-
rural administrative area classification used by UK central government (see Office of the 
Deputy Prime Minister 2002). 
A second, major, potential reason explaining the presence of excessive zeroes in our 
data is that local governments in which citizens’, on average, are more receptive to market-
based solutions to public policy problems will be more likely to exhibit zero publicly-owned 
social housing stock. Hence, we include the percentage share of the vote gained by the 
Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties in local elections in the logit part of the model as 
a measure of the pro-market attitudes of local residents. As noted above, despite some 
convergence in antipathy towards public ownership during the study period, Conservative 
voters, in particular, still remain more open to alternative forms of public service provision 
than their Labour voting counterparts (Adams, Green and Milazzo, 2012). 
Following estimation of the logit part of the model, the second stage of the ZINB 
model, i.e. the negative binomial equation, predicts the number of count events (i.e. the 
number of local government-owned dwellings). It does this by estimating the relationship 
between the size of the public housing stock and the independent variables described above, 
given that a local government is willing to retain ownership of social housing, as predicted by 
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the logit part of the model. Thus, formally, for an outcome variable y, the ZINB model 
specifies 
 
 
 
where π is the logistic function and f(.) is the negative binomial distribution (see Cameron 
and Trivedi, 1998).  
Several statistical tests support our choice of a ZINB model over competing models 
such as Poisson, Zero Inflated Poisson (ZIP) and/or single equation-NB models. First, 
likelihood ratio tests (LR)1 suggest that our response variable is clearly affected by over-
dispersion issues, thus confirming our preliminary exploratory analysis and reinforcing our 
initial view about the suitability of NB models over Poisson models (see Table 2). Second, 
Akaike’s information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) for the fitted 
models provide statistical evidence in favour of the ZINB model over the single-equation NB 
model.  
[Table 2 about here] 
 
Although all these tests point to the appropriateness of the ZINB model, we also 
estimate a single-equation NB model to check the robustness of our results to different model 
specifications. As a final precaution, we additionally estimate a single-equation NB model2 
including dummies for each local government (the so-called unconditional fixed-effects 
approach; see Allison and Waterman, 2002) to control for potential non-observable time-
invariant confounders. The results of our analysis, however, do not seem to depend on the 
                                                 
1
 The likelihood-ratio chi-square tests whether the dispersion parameter alpha is equal to zero. Large test 
statistics would suggest that the outcome variable is over-dispersed. 
2
 To the best of our knowledge, the fixed effect approach cannot be extended to ZINB models. 
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model choice, with all three models producing similar results for our main variables of 
interest (see Table 4 below). 
 
RESULTS 
Table 3 reports the estimated parameters of the ZINB regression model, which includes, as 
discussed in the previous section, a logit and a NB model. The logit part of the model predicts 
the probability of not having any public housing stock at all during the period under study. 
The results of the logit model suggest, first, that the political ideology of the ruling party 
influences the likelihood of having zero housing stock. In particular, the coefficient for 
Conservative control is positive and statistically significant. Hence, local governments with 
right-wing party rule appear (on average) to be more likely to have transferred all their 
housing stock, when compared to those with any other form of political control, even given 
the policy context in which Labour-controlled councils were offered substantial incentives to 
undertake stock transfer. Consistent with our expectations, the coefficient for the rural 
dummy variable is also positive and statistically significant, suggesting therefore that local 
governments serving rural areas are more likely to exhibit zero stock values than those 
serving urban populations. On the other hand, the coefficient for pro-market vote shares, 
though positive, is not statistically significant. Thus, voters’ preferences for less government 
intervention in public service delivery does not increase the likelihood of having zero public 
housing stock. 
The results of the NB part of the model predicting the number of public dwellings are 
also reported in Table 3. The interpretation of coefficients in NB models, however, is 
somewhat complicated because of the use of a log-link function. To better illustrate the 
results we therefore compute the discrete change in the dependent variable given a one 
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standard deviation (SD) change in the independent variable(s), while holding all other 
independent variables at their means. 
 
[Table 3 about here] 
 
Starting with the analysis of the ideology variable, we find no evidence that local 
governments led by the Labour party tend to keep more public housing stock: the predicted 
discrete change (and the coefficient estimate) for Labour majority is positive, as expected, but 
not statistically significant. Thus, our first hypothesis based on the assumptions of the citizen-
candidate model is not confirmed. Even given the salience of the government’s efforts to 
encourage stock transfer in disadvantaged urban areas, Labour controlled councils were (on 
average) no more likely to have a large stock of public housing than other councils. 
Nevertheless, it is possible that our findings for Labour political control may reflect a ‘new’ 
Labour effect, with aggregation of all Labour local governments masking significant 
differences in public ownership between ‘old’ Labour councils committed to ‘in-house’ 
provision and their ‘new’ Labour counterparts open to a more mixed economy of social 
housing provision.  
To try to disentangle the complex ideological effects of the changing nature of the 
Labour party during the 1990s and 2000s we added to our statistical models an ‘old’ Labour 
dummy variable. This was constructed by defining ‘old’ Labour councils as those that were 
both in the top 50 for Labour vote shares in the local elections prior to the Labour national 
government in 1997 and controlled by Labour during our study period (i.e. 2001-2014). 
While the coefficient for this ‘old’ Labour measure was positive when included in our ZINB 
model it did not achieve statistical significance. Hence, we cannot say with confidence that it 
is possible to identify a ‘new’/’old’ Labour effect on the size of the local council-owned 
housing stock for our study period. Nevertheless, this is certainly something worthy of more 
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in-depth investigation across all aspects of local government behaviour during the study 
period, perhaps through detailed analysis of the minutes of council meetings for the study 
period or examination of local newspaper reports.     
In contrast with the findings for Labour political control, local residents’ political 
preferences seem to be an important predictor of the number of local-government-owned 
dwellings, providing support for our second hypothesis. Local governments with higher 
Labour vote shares appear to own relatively more dwellings when compared to governments 
with lower Labour vote shares. In particular, our model predicts that a one standard deviation 
increase in the Labour vote share is associated with an increase in the number of public 
dwellings of 1659.31, approximately twenty-five per cent more than the average housing 
stock size.  
As regards our control variables, our findings suggest that the quantity of service 
need, measured through the index of multiple deprivation, is another important predictor of 
the scale of the local government-owned housing stock. A one standard deviation increase in 
the index of relative deprivation is associated with a predicted increase in the number of 
public dwellings of 1622.74 – an effect size very similar to that for the Labour local vote 
share. That said, the measures of the diversity of service need, i.e. age, ethnic and social class 
diversity, do not seem to be related to the size of the public housing stock. Although the 
coefficients for ethnic and social class diversity have the expected positive sign, they are not 
statistically significant at the 5% level. Age diversity exhibits a negative sign and is not 
statistically significant. Unsurprisingly, the size of the population served by a local 
government seems to explain housing stock figures; a one standard deviation increase of the 
logarithm of population is associated with an increase in the number of dwellings by 4058.47 
– about two-thirds more than the average public housing stock level.   
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To further facilitate interpretation of our results, we present in Figure 2 the predicted 
number of public dwellings, comparing local governments led by the Labour party with non-
Labour led governments, given varying values for the other independent variables. The plots 
depicted in Figure 2 clearly illustrate our finding that, while the colour of the ruling party 
does not seem to influence housing stock figures in the period under analysis, after 
controlling for excessive zeroes in our sample, “collectivist” pro-state political preferences, 
socio-economic deprivation and population size have a clear positive relationship with the 
levels of housing stock retained by local governments.  
 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
In what follows, we explore whether our findings remain robust to alternative model 
specifications. Table 4 reports the estimated parameters of the single-equation NB model and 
estimates of a single-equation NB model including local government fixed effects. Overall, 
both sets of estimates underline that Labour political control does not seem to have a 
statistically significant effect on the levels of local government housing stock. Regarding our 
second variable of interest, i.e. Labour vote share, the estimates reported in Table 4 remain 
very similar to the ZINB regression, though the coefficient estimates are slightly larger. 
Turning to the control variables, socio-economic deprivation continues to be an important 
influence on public housing stock, with both NB models predicting that the higher the 
deprivation rate the larger the number of public dwellings. By contrast, the results for the 
other controls are not so conclusive.  First, the point estimates for ethnic and social diversity 
become statistically significant when estimating a single-equation NB model, though their 
effect size is still very small. Second, the magnitude and sign for the coefficient for 
population size changes dramatically when including local government fixed effects in our 
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model – a finding that could reflect the inability of fixed effects models to accurately estimate 
the effect of covariates that have very little within variance (Plumper and Troeger, 2007). 
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
 
In summary, using multivariate regression models that integrate socio-economic and 
political variables, our results suggest that politics is an important feature of the 
externalisation of public housing delivery, influencing public sector reform at the local level. 
In particular, our findings suggest that the citizen candidate model may help to predict reform 
implementation success – Conservative local governments are more likely to have no public 
housing stock at all; while the median voter perspective predicts reform implementation 
resistance – Labour-voting areas have higher levels of publicly-owned housing.  
One potential explanation for these findings is that, during the genesis of housing 
stock transfers, i.e. the 1980s and early 1990s, social housing policies in England reflected an 
ideological stance influenced by the Conservative’s “anti‐municipalism” and by the aim to 
stimulate private sector engagement in local public services (Stewart and Burridge, 1988; 
Oatley, 1998). At the same time, council housing sales were considered unacceptable by 
Labour-controlled local governments until 1997, when the Labour government in power at 
the national level also started to promote social housing externalisation policies – albeit with 
a strong preference in favour of non-profit providers (Pawson and Mullins, 2010). 
Nonetheless, it is precisely from the late 1990s when political organizations supporting 
campaigns against council housing transfers, such as the DCH, emerged across the UK, 
which may explain our finding that in more collectivist local areas, where anti-transfer 
campaigns may have received stronger support, there is a larger stock of publicly-owned 
dwellings. As such, this study offers support to the arguments advanced in previous studies 
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highlighting the importance of political considerations when explaining social housing 
externalisation policies.   
 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have analysed the politics of public housing reform in English local 
governments, focusing on the ideological and political influences on the size of the publicly-
owned dwelling stock. Our analysis was guided by two alternative models of political 
competition: the citizen-candidate model, which emphasises parties’ political ideologies; and, 
the median voter model, which emphasises citizens’ political preferences. Although the 
political variables we analyse certainly do not account for all the variation in publicly-owned 
housing stock, the findings that we present suggest that both models may offer valuable 
insights for understanding the politics of local public sector reform. Ideology seems to play 
an important role in making reforms happen, but resistance, antipathy and alternatives to 
those reforms appear to be driven by local political preferences. These findings have 
important implications for the study of local politics and government. 
Firstly, we provide statistical evidence that the enactment of local public sector 
reform may be influenced by ideological forces, as the citizen-candidate model implies. 
Right-wing political control, in particular, may be associated with large-scale structural 
changes to the local state – Conservative-led local governments in England appear more 
likely to have disposed all publicly-owned dwelling stock than their counterparts ruled by 
other political parties. Nevertheless, our findings also highlight that Labour-led governments 
are no more or less likely to be committed to publicly-owned social housing than 
governments led by parties of other political hues. This may perhaps, in part, be a reflection 
of the ‘new’ Labour convergence towards the wider public sector reform agenda of the 
Conservative Party (Hay, 1999). Future quantitative and qualitative studies of the ideological 
influences on public sector reform should therefore seek to understand the extent to which 
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local policy commitments may reflect the operation of wider political ideologies or be driven 
by the financial and operational imperatives of individual organizations and their leaders.  
Secondly, our study confirms the insights of the ‘Downsian’ political competition 
literature regarding the salience of citizens’ preferences for public policy implementation. 
That said, it offers a nuanced and valuable counterpoint to simplistic accounts of the 
connection between preferences and policies, highlighting that citizens’ hostility towards a 
given proposal may be a more important determinant of implementation success than their 
embrace of the aims and objectives behind that proposal. It is therefore essential to always 
consider the role of citizens’ preferences in models of local public sector reform, and to 
establish the relative salience of ideological versus political influences on whether reforms 
are successfully enacted by local governments. Grassroots resistance to unpopular local 
policies has long been a theme in the literature on political activism in developed (see Norris, 
2002) and developing countries (see Scott, 1985). Further quantitative and qualitative 
evidence on the dynamics of campaigns against housing stock transfer proposals in the UK 
and elsewhere would therefore cast valuable further light on this important issue. 
Despite the strengths of our approach to analysing the politics of public housing 
reform, limitations in our study design furnish valuable opportunities for further research. 
First, although we offer a longitudinal investigation of the determinants of local government-
owned housing stock in England, our findings may not be altogether generaliseable to other 
countries. The UK is a noted public sector reform pioneer, with a distinctive Anglo-Saxon 
political and administrative culture (Pollitt and Bouckert, 2011). That said, due to the strength 
of the central state, local government in the UK is also acknowledged to have less autonomy 
than its counterparts elsewhere in Europe often possess (John and Copus, 2011). Hence, 
while the data requirements for undertaking a comparison of the politics of public housing 
across multiple countries may be somewhat daunting, such an endeavour could nonetheless 
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reveal much about the politics and management of the local state in different political 
systems. As well as seeking to develop a large-scale time-series of administrative data for this 
purpose, researchers could also seek to bring together information from cross-country surveys 
(e.g. the European Social Survey) on attitudes towards public housing and political 
preferences.   
Second, our study examines public housing reform aimed at the divestment of state-
owned assets at a time when the financial and political pressure on local governments to 
consider alternatives to state-managed public services was particularly strong (Bel, Hebdon 
and Warner, 2007), especially in the area of social housing (Scanlon, Fernandez-Arrigoitia 
and Whitehead, 2015). Due to limited data availability, we have been unable to fully explore 
the full range of alternative approaches to the provision of social housing at the local level 
that this has prompted in England. For instance, the balance between social renting, private 
renting and owner-occupation varies considerably across local governments, and this may in 
part reflect political considerations. Moreover, while the impact of the right-to-buy scheme is 
held constant in our analysis as it is a national-level policy, it is quite possible that 
Conservative councils marketed this policy more aggressively, and that this partly explains 
the greater likelihood that they have no public housing stock at all. For all these reasons, it 
would be interesting to undertake detailed case-studies within individual local governments 
to better understand the dynamics of the local politics around social housing. Likewise, a 
similar study to that presented here could be carried out in circumstances where public 
investment in social housing by local governments was encouraged rather than discouraged. 
Historical analysis of varying local responses to the post-war programme for the construction 
of council housing in the UK, for example, could serve as a useful complement to our 
analysis, as would research investigating the politics of public housing works in developing 
countries (see Wakely, 2014).  
26 
 
Finally, it is possible that the politics of public housing reform are not wholly 
representative of that associated with other parts of the local public sector. In particular, 
primary and secondary education are the main public services provided by English local 
governments, and policy developments in this field are largely driven by the aspirations of 
the middle-class (Ball, 2013), rather than their concerns about the tax burden posed by 
meeting social needs. That said, there is evidence from other local public services in England 
that models of political competition are reliable predictors of the policy choices made by 
local government. In particular, analysis of the adoption of alternative forms of providing 
leisure services suggests that political preferences influence the choice of contractor made by 
local governments (Alonso, Andrews and Hodgkinson, 2016). All in all, further investigation 
of the politics of reforms to the different parts of the English local government system would 
therefore prove invaluable in illuminating the dynamics of local democracy, as, of course, 
would similar analyses undertaken in other countries.  
In conclusion, our study has highlighted the role that politics may play in shaping 
public sector reform at the local level. Ideological commitments may have motivated large-
scale changes to the scope and responsibilities of the local state in some areas, and political 
attitudes may have prevented the emergence and enactment of such plans in other areas. We 
have also illustrated that social and economic circumstances too may exert an important 
influence on the nature of public sector reform in sub-national governments. Further research 
comparing the relative salience of ideological and political motives on proposals for 
restructuring the local state would therefore add vital knowledge on the forces that shape 
local public sector reform. 
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TABLE 1  
Data sources and descriptive statistics 
Variable | Source Mean Std. Dev. VIF 
Housing stock A 6346.735 9483.191  
Labour control B 0.215 0.411 1.92 
Labour vote share B 25.135 14.887 2.56 
Deprivation C 19.707 9.503 2.6 
Age diversity D 8731.398 183.854 1.14 
Ethnic diversity D 1965.780 1888.053 1.62 
Social diversity D 8664.902 226.255 1.19 
Housing spending  E 27.134 28.557 1.74 
Population (log) D 11.822 0.537 1.53 
Notes: To deal with non-normal distributions of the variable measuring population we use its logged value. VIF refers to 
the Variance Inflation Factor.  
Data sources:  
A; Department for Communities and Local Government.  
B; Rallings C & Thrasher M, various years, Local Elections in Britain: A Statistical Digest (LGC Elections Centre, 
University of Plymouth).  
C; Department for Communities and Local Government.  
D; Office for National Statistics (census data). 
E; Chartered Institute for Public Finance and Accountancy. CIPFA Finance and General Statistics.  
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TABLE 2  
Model selection criteria LR, AIC and BIC of the fitted models 
Model selection criteria Poisson NB ZIP ZINB 
LR  2.1e+07  1.2e+07 
AIC 2.103e+07 72081.935 1.183e+07 70376.82 
BIC 2.103e+07 72146.124 1.183e+07 70466.68 
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TABLE 3  
ZINB model for local government-owned social housing stock 
 
Coefficient 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
P-value Discrete 
change 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
P-value 
NB model       
Labour control 0.02075 0.06535 0.751 126.106 397.044 0.751 
Labour vote share 0.01624 0.00317 0.000 1659.351 391.204 0.000 
Deprivation 0.02493 0.00495 0.000 1622.774 392.073 0.000 
Age diversity -0.00037 0.00030 0.219 -399.086 314.272 0.204 
Ethnic diversity 0.00002 0.00002 0.365 213.409 237.854 0.370 
Social diversity 0.00029 0.00015 0.053 411.08 219.332 0.061 
Housing spending  0.00026 0.00071 0.714 45.46 125.256 0.717 
Population (log) 0.95329 0.07204 0.000 4058.471 533.237 0.000 
Logit model         |       
Conservative control 0.40718 0.18688 0.029    
Pro market vote share 0.00842 0.00614 0.170    
Rural district 0.74374 0.23057 0.001    
Log-likelihood -35174.41      
Observations 4532      
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the local government level.  
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TABLE 4  
Robustness checks 
 Negative Binomial model Negative Binomial model including unit fixed effects 
 
Coefficient 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
P-value Coefficient 
Robust 
Std. Err. 
P-value 
Labour control 0.0134 0.0920 0.884 -0.2030 0.1367 0.138 
Labour vote share 0.0243 0.0048 0.000 0.0226 0.0085 0.008 
Deprivation 0.0204 0.0072 0.004 0.0886 0.0269 0.001 
Age diversity -0.0003 0.0005 0.516 -0.0017 0.0011 0.118 
Ethnic diversity 0.0001 0.0000 0.029 0.0000 0.0001 0.787 
Social diversity 0.0005 0.0002 0.029 0.0003 0.0003 0.364 
Housing spending  -0.0010 0.0011 0.349 -0.0042 0.0017 0.011 
Population (log) 1.1365 0.1006 0.000 -4.2738 1.5379 0.005 
Log-likelihood -36030.97   -33579.35   
Observations 4532   4532   
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered at the local government level. 
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FIGURE 1 
Frequency distribution of local government-owned housing stock, 2001-2014 
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FIGURE 2 
Predicted public housing stock with 95% confidence intervals 
 
 
 
